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Abstract—This paper discusses the effect of trust and informa-
tion privacy concerns on citizens’ attitude towards national 
identity management systems. We introduce the privacy-
concerns-trust model, which shows the role of trust in mediat-
ing and moderating citizens’ attitude towards identity man-
agement systems. We adopted a qualitative research approach 
in our analysis of data that was gathered through a series of 
interviews and a stakeholder workshop in Ghana. Our findings 
indicate that, beyond the threshold level of trust, societal in-
formation privacy concern is low; hence, trust is high, thereby 
encouraging further institutional collaboration and acceptance 
of citizens’ informational self-determination.   
Keywords-Identity Management; PCT Curve; Privacy Con-
cern; Trust; Trusted Identities. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Although digital Identity Management (IdM) is funda-
mental to electronic government, globally, its implementa-
tion and adoption by citizens usually presents complex issues 
for its many stakeholders. The complexity has been attrib-
uted to the fact that it transcends technological issues as well 
as policy, legal, institutional, and economic aspects of soci-
ety. The complexity is also compounded by the rate, t 
which standards and technological solutions become bso-
lete; the flexibility and ease of collection, use, dissemination 
of data; and the increased link-ability of information to the 
data subject. This raises the potential for privacy concerns 
[1].  
Ironically, previous privacy research has shown that in-
dividuals disclose personal information in exchange for some 
economic or social benefit subject to the "privacy calculus", 
an assessment that their personal information will subse-
quently be used fairly, and that they will not suffer negative 
consequences [2]. Moreover, where individuals can exercise 
some degree of control over data collection and use; infor-
mation is collected in the context of an existing relationship; 
the information collected or used is relevant to the ransac-
tion; and they believe the information will be used to draw 
reliable and valid inferences about them; citizens are less 
likely to raise concerns. Unfortunately, this is usually not the 
case. These phenomena often occur without direct involve-
ment or control of the data subjects. 
Governments in many countries have implemented some 
form of identity management as a critical enabler of govern-
ment to citizens’ interactions, and in facilitation f business 
transactions. Unfortunately, the costs of implementations are 
usually not matched by the benefits and citizens’ adoption of 
the expected or improvement in public services. This makes 
it difficult for governments to justify the implementation, 
since it often leads to embarrassment [3, 4].  
In spite of its use being lower than expected, identity 
management can play a leading role, if the factors that affect 
its takeoff are properly addressed. Trusted identiti s ecosys-
tems have been found to be very critical to the success of 
digital IdMS. This research focuses on understanding the key 
stakeholder concerns on information privacy in regads to the 
collection, storage, use, and transmission of personal identity 
information [5], and how such concerns should be addressed 
to ensure trusted identities.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows; the next 
section discusses the theoretical background for trust and 
privacy concerns, followed by a description of our research 
design and methods. We then discuss our findings from the 
stakeholder workshop and the interviews. We present our 
conclusions and recommendations for further studies in the 
final part of the paper. 
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The growing deployment of innovative systems for col-
lecting, processing, and sharing personally identifiable in-
formation places data subjects in a vulnerable situation and 
has propensity to undermine confidence in identity manage-
ment systems. A 2012 Europe-wide survey [6] revealed that 
online users are naturally concerned about risks in online 
transactions, and that users are not in control of their per-
sonal information disclosed on the Internet. The survey also 
revealed that users employ a variety of offline and o line 
methods to protect their identity; 62 % of users better under-
stand how to protect their identity in the offline transactions 
using data minimization techniques, whilst 90 % trust na-
tional institutions and banks more than Internet servic  pro-
viders and e-shops [6]. Such observations cannot be true in 
many developing countries.  
In developing countries many of the electronic govern-
ment projects are viewed with suspicion with very low level 
of trust in the institutions that manage credentials. The 
source documents required for proofs of identities, i. .  civil 
registration systems are often unreliable [7] due to several 
instances of multiple registrations and enrolment of unquali-
fied people. Businesses, usually, have difficulties in verify-
ing the authenticity of credentials individuals presented for 
access to services. Credentials can in many instances only be 
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verified manually, resulting in undue delays and customer 
frustration with its attendant privacy information implica-
tions. 
A. Information Privacy Concerns 
The issue of privacy is generally based on cognitive per-
ceptions rather than on rational assessments. Privacy concern 
has been used as a key privacy construct by researchers [8, 
9]. Smith et al. [10] developed the concern for information 
privacy (CFIP) model for operationalizing privacy concerns 
based on data collection, errors, secondary use, and unau-
thorized access to information or invasion. Collection, use 
and transmission of personal information by identity provid-
ers and relying parties must in principle be based on tacit or 
explicit consent by service providers to protect the interest of 
data subjects [2]. Citizens, therefore, become apprehensive, 
when their interests are not observed, or the perceived risk of 
the abuse exceeds the benefits derived from such implied 
social contracts.  
These tensions between organizational use of personal in-
formation and societal information privacy concern a e very 
topical in privacy research [11]. Previous studies have de-
fined privacy as the ability of an individual to exercise some 
degree of control of the access that others have to their per-
sonal information [12]. Privacy is at risk, if individuals are 
unable to exercise control over their personal information 
during social interactions and business transactions [13, 14], 
and it is therefore disheartening for privacy-aware citizens to 
find out that inaccurate, out-dated, excessive or irrelevant 
data about them are stored by others. 
Information privacy concerns can be categorised as 
• Illegitimate use of information [10], and  
• Secondary use of personal information without the 
consent of the data subject, for purposes outside the 
primary reason for data collection [1]. 
Therefore, it is imperative that organizations develop in-
formation practices that address the perceived risks and citi-
zens concerns in order to project an innate trust [15, 16]. 
Although privacy concerns are almost always measured at an 
individual level of analysis, societal concern (overall privacy 
concerns of a nation) should reflect the concerns of its citi-
zens and organizations [17, 18]. Various governmental i er-
ventions like regulations and controls are implemented to 
address societal information privacy concerns. Although 
Bélanger & Crossler [17] and others have discussed th  pri-
vacy concern, there is still a need to clarify how privacy con-
cern and trust affect each other within the context of identity 
management. This is one of the objectives of this study. 
B. Trust 
Trust plays an important role in societal discourses and 
attitudes towards electronic identification systems. Due 
process requires that organizations apply best practices in 
data acquisition and also strive to prevent illegitimate access 
by others to personal data in their custody. Bhattacharya et 
al. [19] describes trust as having a multidimensional con-
struct and defined trust as an expectancy of positive or non-
negative outcomes that one can receive based on the ex-
pected action of another party in an interaction characterized 
by uncertainty [19]. Broadly, trust is considered as a firm 
belief in the reliability, competence, qualification, ability, 
strength, integrity, truthfulness, honesty, sincerity, and loy-
alty of the other party to transaction or interaction [20].  
In their study on “an alternative model of trust”, Mayer et 
al. [15] modelled the concept of trust by categorizing the key 
attributes of trustworthiness as the trustees’ ability to fulfil 
the trusting action, the benevolence of trustees’ intentions, 
and their integrity [15, 21]. Their definition was based on 
one person’s beliefs about the characteristics of an ther per-
son. In effect, trustworthiness can be operationalized using 
these three attributes of the trustee. Ability signif es compe-
tence or perceived expertise, business sense and judgement. 
Consistency, fairness and reliability describe integri y, 
whereas loyalty, openness and availability signify benevo-
lence [15, 16]. These attributes are important determinants of 
the success of IdMS, since it can affect the usage behaviours 
of the systems.  
A trust relationship is made up of three elements – he 
truster, the trustee, and the context in which trust is conferred 
[20]. Trusters are the citizens and relying parties, the trustees 
are the credential issuers and service providers, and the con-
text is an IdMS or the electronic identity card scheme.  
Perception of trust can be either due to the technology or 
the institutions [22]. A low citizens trust in credentials issu-
ers and IdMS will be a major disincentive to accept the 
IdMS, since there is lack of identity assurance [23]. Such 
lack of trust can lead to unfavourable outcomes of the IdMS. 
Likewise, a low trust in credential issuers coupled with a 
high trust in the technology leads to a situation, where citi-
zens might use technology as a competitive tool against the 
unpredictable and sporadic results. In such a scenario the 
IdMS will be viewed with suspicion and cynicism by the 
citizens [24, 22]. 
C. Relationship Between Trust and Privacy Concern 
Various studies have established a relationship between 
trust and people’s willingness to forgo their privacy concerns 
[25, 26]. What is not certain is the nature of the relationship 
between privacy, trust and societal attitude towards identity 
management systems. Trust is known to be a mediator be-
tween privacy concerns and behaviour [26, 27]. Thus, tr t 
(the mediator) is what explains the effect that privacy con-
cern (independent or predictor variable) has on societal atti-
tude (the dependent or criterion variable). For insta ce, a 
correlation between income and cancer might be explained 
by a correlation between income and smoking (the media-
tor), and then between smoking and cancer. Thus, according 
to mediation models, privacy has little or no direct ffect on 
behaviour; instead any effect can be explained by the links 
between privacy and trust, and then between trust and behav-
iour.  
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The relationship between privacy concern and trust can 
also be explained using the concept of moderation [28]. 
Moderators are variables that affect the directions and 
strengtsh of a relationship between an independent and a 
dependent variable [28]. Thus, in the case of privacy nd 
trust, where there is high trust, privacy concern exerts an 
influence on behaviour, while in low trust environments pri-
vacy concern may have a negligible impact on behaviour, 
since behaviour is limited by the lack trust. This study ex-
plains mediator and moderator relationships between privacy 
concerns, trust and citizens attitudes towards natio l iden-
tity management systems. 
D. Modelling Identity 
Wilton [29] described digital identity as the relationship 
of identity between a person at the time of enrolment, and a 
person at the time of authentication [29]. Thus, identity is not 
just a snapshot of a person, but part of a process from enrol-
ment and credential issue to credential presentatio, authen-
tication and revocation [29]. When such a process is not fol-
lowed or abused, citizens become concerned and lose confi-
dence in the system or the identity service providers. 
E. Privacy Concern-Trust Curve 
Generally, societal interactions and business relationships 
begin from a low level of trust (distrust) and high privacy 
concern. With disclosure of more information, strong i stitu-
tional cooperation and user awareness, users are able to exer-
cise some degree of user control over their personal informa-
tion, resulting in the establishment of a certain leve  of trust. 
Thus, citizens become more empowered and revise their 
negative perceptions about the IdMS and identity servic  
providers. This establishment of trust reduces the initial pri-
vacy concerns. Thus, a high privacy concern is associated 
with low level of trust, and reduction in privacy concern re-
sults in an increase in trust. In other words, the m diating 
and moderating effect of trust can result in either a negative 
or positive societal attitude changes towards IdMS.  
The qualitative relationship between trust and privacy 
concern is shown in Fig. 1. A certain threshold leve  of trust 
must be overcome, before the citizens are ready to open up 
for interaction. The figure also shows that absolute trust or 
zero privacy concern is not possible within a trusted identi-
ties environment, and hence the curve can only asymptoti-
cally approach the two axes. The purpose of the trust f ame-
work therefore is for society to establish the framework that 
can overcome the trust threshold. Beyond this level, trust and 
privacy is adequate to encourage more collaboration, crea-
tion of new identity-based services, institutional co labora-
tion, etc.  
III.  RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
This study entailed two main phases – an exploratory 
phase, which saw the development of the model based on 
literature, and a qualitative based confirmatory phase, which 
was used to evaluate the model. The conceptual model on the 
basis of theoretical considerations is part of an on-g ing re-
search project that seeks to present a reliable and v li  in-
strument for measuring trusted identities ecosystem. The 
exploratory phase of the study was organized in line with 
two-step approach for operationalizing constructs and identi-
fying measures [30]. Due to the multi-stakeholder nature of 
trusted national identities, we decided to adopt a research 
approach that engages the key actors and hence a qualitative 
methodological approach was deemed the most appropriate 
means for data collection from a societal perspectiv  [31, 
32]. We also applied the concepts of Interpretative Phe-
nomenological Analysis [33] in our data analysis because of 
its usefulness in understanding the experiences of individu-
als. The overarching research question was “what are the 
key requirements for crafting a trusted identities ecosystem”. 
A. Stakeholder Workshop 
Given the societal level of analysis, a stakeholder wo k-
shop was organized in Accra, Ghana. All the major stake-
holders involved in the collection, storage use andissue of 
identity were represented, including Registrar of Births & 
Death, The Passport Office, Driver and Vehicle Licensing 
Agency (DVLA), National Identification Authority (NIA), 
National Health Insurance Authority (NHIS), Electoral 
Commission (EC), Ghana Revenue Authority, financial insti-
tutions and identity-related businesses, academic institutions, 
national institutions and non-governmental organisations 
involved in civil right advocacy, and the general public. The 
identification challenges in Ghana are considered to be typi-
cal of many developing countries. 
During the workshop participants were offered the oppor-
tunity to discuss a number of prepared questions and scenar-
ios. To inform discussions, participants listened to presenta-
tions on various aspects of trust, privacy and secondary uses 
of personal information. The presentations also highlighted 
the key concepts of trusted identities and the policy, techno-
logical and regulatory implications as well as relat d IdMS 
research and practices in OECD countries [34, 35]. The ideal 
situation as illustrated on Figure 2 was used to explain the 
benefits of trusted identities. 
Some of the discussion questions were: 
Figure 1.  Qualitative relationship between privacy concern and trust. 
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1. What are the potential benefits and risks regarding 
the secondary uses of personal information? 
2. What are the major challenges in relying on existing 
credentials presented for access to services? 
3. How can institutional cooperation be encouraged 
given the conflicting regulations? 
4. What attributes does citizens look for before trusting 
organizations with respect to secondary use of per-
sonal information? 
5. What can be done to address issues arising from in-
appropriate use and/or exploitation of personal in-
formation? 
6. What regulations, legislation, and/or policies are 
needed to address the evolving challenges? 
B. Interviews 
A series of stakeholder interviews were conducted before 
and after the workshop. The pre-workshop interviews were 
made to identify the key issues and challenges fromdifferent 
perspectives. This helped in choosing and phrasing the dis-
cussion questions for the stakeholder workshop. The follow-
up interviews were conducted to clarify some of the points 
raised during the workshop to solicit for further information. 
Interviewees included the officials of identity issuers, policy 
makers, journalists, private businesses involved in identity 
verification, and identity card manufacturers. 
C. Transcription and Coding 
Although raw data can sometimes be of interest in re-
search they do not usually help the reader to understand the 
world under scrutiny and participants’ views without a sys-
tematic analysis to illuminate the situation under investiga-
tion [36]. Transcripts were thus initially coded to aid mean-
ingful analysis. Data coding, which is an important part of 
analysis, involves subdividing data into chunks of varying-
sized words, phrases, sentences or whole paragraphs, nd 
assigning categories [37]. Thus, codes are labels for allocat-
ing units of meaning to descriptive or inferential information 
compiled during a study. One of the key objectives of our 
coding approach is to identify relevant examples of the phe-
nomena and analysis of the phenomena tp discover distinct 
patterns, differences and commonalities [37].  
Transcript of the workshop discussions and the inter-
views, in the form of audio-visual recordings, intervi w 
notes and summary of discussion sessions, were produced by 
the authors. The introductory background of speakers and 
interviewees were, however, included for coding andaly-
sis purposes. This was meant to maintain speaker anonymity. 
No attempt was made to identify speech patterns, sice that 
was not the focus of our research. The nature of the discus-
sions and interviews was such that initial coding would not 
have been helpful since participant interviewees were from 
diverse backgrounds, and opinions were varied. Each of t e 
transcripts was coded on the basis of the background f the 
various speakers, since each of the participants and inter-
viewees were told to introduce themselves before speaking. 
This served as basis for coding and sub-categorization of the 
transcript. 
IV. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
A. Societal Concerns 
Comments and statements made by participants during 
the interviews and workshop revealed a number of societal 
concerns and the various sources of them. Some of the con-
cerns are listed below: 
• “The identity agencies are only there to please their 
political party and not because they are skilled”. 
• “If the electoral commission knew what they are doing, 
why will they opt for a biometric system without a 
means of verification”? 
• “The information on the National Identification Author-
ity website is so scanty that I have no idea what is going 
on.” 
• “I wonder if the officials of the identification agencies 
read our emails or even if the emails get to the organi-
sations in the first place, because they never respond to 
emails sent to addresses they have provided”. 
• “If I have a problem, I have no idea how to reach them 
by phone or on the Internet, except if I walk to their 
head office” 
• “I do not know the use of all the information collect d 
by many of the identification agencies. For instance, I 
do not understand, why my actual date of birth is stated 
on my driving license, when they could have simply 
stated that I am over eighteen or qualified to drive.”  
• “Since one can present different documents as proof of 
identity during voter registration or drivers’ license ac-
quisition, it gives room for multiple registrations.” 
Such comments show the need for societal assurance that 
their opinions are taken seriously. In a situation, where citi-
zens do not get responses for the concerns raised, it gives the 
impression that citizens are not involved in decision  that 
concern them. It is therefore important to empower citizens 
in order to generate commitment and contributions. I  es-
sence, when citizens’ opinions are taken seriously, they feel 
Figure 2. Dimensions of Trusted Identity Management Systems. 
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that they are involved in decision-making and empowered, 
resulting in increased trust [38, 39].  
Moreover, recruitment of unqualified personnel shows a 
lack of ability and integrity, which are all key attributes of 
trustworthiness [15, 40]. This is also manifested in com-
ments like  
• “I always read stories in the dailies about impersona-
tion and people making fake documents especially pass-
ports and birth certificates; many of the officials re in-
volved”.  
However, citizens would like to have informational self-
determination - a sense of freedom to do what is interesting, 
personally important, and psychologically vitalizing [41]. 
Such concerns lead to distrust in government institutions and 
therefore very critical that the system for tracking vital 
source documents like birth and marriage certificates is im-
proved. The key aspects of the civil registration that need to 
be made efficient include, birth, marriage and death registra-
tion.  
B. Segregation of Personally Identifiable Information  
Article 7.1 of the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child states that “the child shall be registered 
immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to 
a name, the right to acquire a nationality, and as f r as pos-
sible, the right to know and be cared for by his or he  par-
ents”. The birth certificate for instance contains the given 
name, surname (or family name), gender, date of birth, place 
of birth, and father and mother names. Given the importance 
of the birth certificate in the establishment of the core iden-
tity, its abuse in the form of multiple registration and regis-
tration of illegitimate people defeats its usefulness. If the 
birth registration system were to be strengthened, it could act 
as the basic document that all residents must rely on for ini-
tial registration.  
The information on the birth certificate represents the 
‘Basic Identifier Set’ (BIS) – information that can help iden-
tify a person and does not change over time [29]. Hence, the 
birth certificate can be a very useful document in addressing 
issues of multiple registrations, especially when individuals 
are made to use the number throughout life. In that case, en-
rolment of foreign nationals who reside in the country should 
be based on travel documents as part of the processing of 
residence permit.  
Certain transactions requiring proofs of additional i for-
mation might require credentials that show the individual’s 
Personally Identifiable Information (PII) – additional infor-
mation that is useful for identifying a person but may change 
over time, such as addresses, marital status, physical charac-
teristics like height, hair/eye colour, or complexion [29]. The 
PII provides additional information that can typically not be 
found in the BIS. For border control purposes passport may 
be preferred more than a birth certificate. In other s ctor-
specific transactions and interactions, other attribu e data are 
necessary for effective identity verification. This k nd of data 
is information that on its own might not be able to identify a 
person, but will provide important traces when linked to ei-
ther the BIS or PII data, or when such data are aggregated 
over time and space (e.g. healthcare records, tax return in-
formation, driver’s and vehicle licence, banking and i sur-
ance information. Given the sometimes sensitive nature of 
such information, e.g. health records, it might require addi-
tional level of security to avoid linkability to the BIS and PII. 
In essence, other attribute data are identity-related, albeit 
‘sector-specific’,  
C. Strong Focus on Identity and not Credentials  
A common misunderstanding on the part of credential is-
suers and policy makers during the workshop was the equa-
tion of strong credentials to efficient identity management 
systems. This became apparent from statements like “we 
have introduced biometric based ID cards that are difficult 
to forge”.  
There is, therefore, the need to move away from creden-
tials towards unique identification. A credential such as a 
passport or driving licence typically includes some items 
from each of the three aspects of identity – the BIS, PII such 
as height, eye colour, and some sector-specific data such as 
entitlement to drive specific classes of vehicle, or visas indi-
cating entitlement to enter a specific country. This is illus-
trated on Fig. 3.  
A distinct feature of a credential is that it encapsulates at-
tributes and entitlements in a reliably verifiable form. There 
is therefore the tendency to equate such documents as repre-
senting the identity of a person when in fact they might not 
be representative in a given context. For instance, passports 
and driving licences have historically been presented as fool-
proof documents loaded with the necessary information that 
can enable the holder to access services and for authentica-
tion purposes. This is not without drawbacks, since it is sus-
ceptible to revealing more information about the holder than 
is necessary in any given authentication context. Using a 
passport for proof of age will no doubt reveal the passport 
holder’s name, place of birth and citizenship, and  river’s 
licence used for similar purpose can also reveal your date of 
birth and address.  
A focus on identity will also make it easier to enforce 
policies appropriate to the data in question, particularly when 
different sector-specific data items entail different policy 
controls. For instance, entitlement to drive a vehicl  may not 
be part of major privacy concern, whereas credit statu  will, 
hence data security policies could be segregated to address 
such data. On the other hand, since healthcare history and 
medical conditions are very sensitive, a different set of poli-
cies will apply. Graphically, one might think of this as the 
ability to segregate identity data into sector-specific seg-
ments and cater for discrete management policies by ector 
and data type (cf. Fig. 3). Thus, within a given data segment, 
assertions of identity (‘the holder of this credential is XX’) 
may make one kind of data security policy appropriate, while 
assertions of other attributes (‘the holder of this credential 
has been treated for Repetitive Stress Injury’) may require 
quite different policy treatment. 
D. Application of Privacy Enhancing Tools   
Various privacy-enhancing and minimal disclosure tech-
nologies have been tested that address the requirement not to 
reveal unnecessary details in transactions. For instance, the 
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touch2ID biometric application allows users to prove their 
age without storing or revealing extra details about the indi-
vidual [42]. Similarly, the ABC4Trust project has released 
and tested guidelines for implementing attribute-based cre-
dential technologies focusing on trust, based on Idemix and 
U-prove technologies [43, 44, 45]. 
In an online context disclosure of excess data can be 
avoided. Credentials can realistically encapsulate just those 
data items, which serve to uniquely identify the holder (such 
as the BIS), as long as they provide a way of linking to the 
rest of the holder’s personal data, which may be held else-
where. In other words, the option now exists to make use of 
the distributed nature of networked computing, so as to allow 
much more flexible ‘placement’ of identity data of di ferent 
types. This is valuable in terms of policy control, because it 
makes it possible to apply controls at the place whre the 
data is held, rather than trying to enforce it wherev  the cre-
dentials are verified.  
E. Encouraging Trusted Environment 
Trust is what moderates and mediates citizens’ privacy 
concerns and attitudes towards IdMS. Thus, individuals are 
likely to engage in transactions, if their level of trust exceeds 
their personal privacy concern threshold, which is reached, 
when the potential benefits outweigh the risks. This t resh-
old will always depend on the type of transaction and the 
amount of identifiable information revealed. For instance, 
transactions requiring the revelation of other attribu e data 
might require a lower trust threshold. Thus, when positive 
steps (i.e., data minimisation) are taken to improve the IdMS, 
the moderation effect of trust will cause citizens to revise 
their attitude towards the IdMS, leading to more trust in the 
credential issuers and the technology and thereby moving 
down and to the right on the trust threshold. Similarly any 
negative actions on the part of credential issuers will increase 
the privacy concern and thereby causing a move upwards 
and to the left on the privacy trust curve. The trusted identi-
ties framework in the United States, where the interest of all 
stakeholders in the identity ecosystems are taken into ac-
count, is a clear step taken by the US government to i crease 
trust [35]. 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This paper discussed the issues and challenges associated 
with accountable management of personal identifiable in-
formation and the provision of more user control over per-
sonally information. The findings from this study suggest 
that information privacy concerns can affect the posture of 
society in relation to attitudes and preferences for regulatory 
environments and willingness to accept a particular identity 
management system [8, 18, 46, 26]. We also highlighted the 
relationship between information privacy concern and trust 
from a societal perspective, and its effect on trusted identity 
management systems.  
Our findings show that unreliable civil registration sys-
tem can be a major reason for such concerns. Given that the 
civil register is in many instances a key source document for 
credential acquisition, its unreliability leads to all kinds of 
credential abuses. Hence, governments especially in devel-
oping countries must focus on strengthening the civil regis-
tration system in order avert such abuses of personal identity 
information.  
Our work clearly shows the two steps towards establi h-
ment of a trusted national framework, which are typical for 
the situation in many developing countries. Initially, trust is 
low and privacy concerns are high, because of poor imple-
mentations, but once the initial problems are identifi d and 
addressed, it is possible to pass a threshold levelof trust, 
thereby reducing privacy concerns and paving the way for 
business and interaction. This is the point at which societal 
trust in Identity service providers is high enough to encour-
age institutional collaboration [22], and citizens’ informa-
tional self-determination [41]. We also highlight te need for 
policy makers to categorise personal information in a way 
that will encourage secondary uses of personal information 
whilst ensuring that sensitive personal information is re-
leased only to legitimate people.  
This study focused mainly on citizens’ attitudes towards 
identification systems in Ghana and that poses a number of 
issues in terms of generalizability that will need to be tested. 
For instance, there are peculiar dynamics pertaining to every 
country and for that matter the inferences drawn might not be 
representative for all developing countries. Moreover, the 
use of a qualitative research approach also gives room for 
inferences that are not tested empirically, as is the case of 
quantitative research. In the future it will be interesting to 
examine quantitatively the relationship between trust and 
privacy concerns in relation to citizens’ attitudes towards 
identity management systems.  
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